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SETTING THE STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT OF A CHAPTER 11
TRUSTEE UNDER § 1 104(A)(1) OF THE BANKRuPTcY CODE:
CAN A DEBTOR COOPERATiVE REMAIN IN POSSESSION?
Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Central Louisiana Electric Co.
74 E3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996)*
Glenda M. Raborn**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978' redefined debtors' rights in the context
of a Chapter 11 reorganization. Through this legislation, Congress created a
reorganization provision fundamentally based on the presumption that the debtor,
after filing a petition for relief, should remain in possession of the estate.2 Op-
posite this presumption, Congress acknowledged the importance of allowing
creditors the opportunity to pursue appointment of a trustee when a debtor is fail-
ing to preserve the estate's assets for the benefit of creditors or where the debtor
is compromising effective reorganization.'
Under § 1104(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress enumerated specific
factors relevant to the appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 reorganization.'
The statute reads in part: "The court shall order the appointment of a trustee...
for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement
of the affairs of the debtor by current management ... or similar cause."' The
illustrative language of § 1104(a)(1) raises two issues: 1) what interpretive ratio-
nales are courts using to apply the statute; and 2) what constitutes "similar
cause" in instances where "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross misman-
agement" are not present?
In Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Central Louisiana Electric Co.,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court's
appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 proceeding under § 1104(a)(1) because
of certain "conflicts of interest" within the debtor's board of directors.7 Cajun
* Full citation is as follows: 69 F3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995), withdrawn in part on reh'g by 74 F3d 599 (5th Cir.
1996).
** The author would like to thank Professor Todd J. Zywicki for his guidance and insight throughout the devel-
opment of this Casenote.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(1994).
4. Id.
5. Id. Section I 104(a)(2), known as the best interests standard, weighs the cost of appointment of a trustee
against the value of the protection received. II U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1994). Generally, it is uncommon for
grounds to exist for appointment of a trustee under § 1 104(a)(2) and not also under § I 104(a)(l). Consequent-
ly, this Note will focus on the statutory language and interpretations of § 1 104(a)(1).
6. 69 E3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995), withdrawn in part on reh'g by 74 E3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996).
7. Id.
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Electric Power Cooperative was operating as a member-owned electrical cooper-
ative.8 Under this organizational structure, much of Cajun's managing board
consisted of representatives of its twelve member companies who, in addition,
purchased electricity from Cajun.' The appellate court concluded that these con-
flicts of interest, which stemmed primarily from Cajun's cooperative structure,
were "inherent conflicts" and constituted "cause" to appoint a Chapter 11
trustee.1" The court stated that "[o]nce cooperative members begin working at
cross-purposes,... the appointment of a trustee may be the only effective way to
pursue reorganization."'1 In implicitly finding the presence of inherent conflicts,
absent any finding that the incumbent management was overtly wasting the assets
of the estate, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Cajun extended the interpretation of §
1104(a)(1) and established a policy of appointing a trustee in cases involving busi-
nesses with conflicts of interest, including member-owned cooperatives.
This Note will examine the standards set forth in § 1104(a)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code for appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. After a review of the leg-
islative history of § 1104(a)(1), this Note will explore the interpretive rationales
emerging in the judicial constructs, as well as the notion of a common theme
underlying the "similar cause" standard. Finally, this Note will analyze the
potential effect of the Fifth Circuit's decision on the cooperative business struc-
ture in future Chapter 11 proceedings.
II. FACTS AND RELEVANT ISSUES
In 1979, Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, a nonprofit electric cooperative,
entered into a Joint Ownership Participation and Operating Agreement with Gulf
States Utilities (hereinafter "GSU") for the construction of a nuclear power plant
(River Bend Nuclear Power Facility). 2 The terms of the Joint Ownership
Agreement required Cajun to pay thirty percent of the construction and operating
costs of the facility in exchange for a thirty percent undivided ownership interest
in River Bend. 3 During contract negotiations, GSU allegedly proposed a total
project cost of $980 million. 4 By project's end, actual costs totaled $4.4 billion.
Cajun was obligated for more than $1.4 billion of that amount. 5
Cajun filed suit against GSU in 1989, requesting rescission of the Joint
Ownership Agreement, asserting GSU fraudulently induced Cajun into entering
into the contract.'" The district court held that Cajun failed to prove fraudulent
inducement and upheld the Agreement. 7 The judicial posture of the Joint
Ownership Agreement litigation cinched Cajun's financial instability.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 747.
10. Id. at 750.
11. Id. at 751.
12. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Gulf States Utils., Inc., 940 E2d 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1991).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 119.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Gulf States Utils., Inc., 1995 WL 875446 at *1 (M.D. La. Oct. 24,
1995).
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Cajun's ultimate blow came when the Louisiana Public Service Commission
ordered the electric cooperative to reduce the rates Cajun was charging its mem-
bers."8 With lower rates, Cajun could no longer service its $4 billion total liabili-
ties.19 On December 21, 1994, the day the rate decrease went into effect, Cajun
filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 1 1.20
Within days of the filing of Cajun's petition, the Rural Utilities Service (here-
inafter "RUS"), an agent of the federal government and one of Cajun's largest
creditors, filed a motion on behalf of several utility companies requesting
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, pursuant to § 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.2" The RUS argued that a disinterested trustee would protect the interests
of the creditors and the estate, and alleviate the conflicts of interest inherent in
Cajun's board of directors.22 The motion alleged specific instances of conflicts of
interest affecting Cajun's managerial functions: 1) individual members of the
board of directors disagreed whether to appeal the Louisiana Public Service
Commission's order to lower its rates; 2) the fiduciary duty owed by Cajun to its
members could not be satisfied while owing a similar duty to the estate and its
creditors; 3) management's failure to collect money owed by member coopera-
tives; and 4) the debtor's primary interest in protecting the lower rates it was
charging members rather than attempting to maximize the value of the estate.23
These conflicts, according to the RUS, demonstrated that the need for a trustee
outweighed the presumption that a Chapter 11 debtor should remain in posses-
sion.2" Moreover, only through appointment of a trustee would the assets of the
estate be preserved for the benefit of Cajun's creditors.2"
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Antecedent Reorganization Provisions
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, two chapters governed business reorgani-
zations.26 Chapter X was established to direct large, public company reorganiza-
tions, whereas Chapter XI was intended for reorganizations of smaller compa-
nies.
18. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Central La. Elec. Co., 69 F.3d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1995).
19. Id. While Cajun was responsible for $1.4 billion resulting from the cost of constructing River Bend, the
company's total indebtedness was estimated at $4 billion.
20. In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 191 B.R. 659, 661 (M.D. La. 1995), vacated, 69 E3d 746 (5th Cir.
1995).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 662. Cajun's conflicts of interest became apparent when several board members faced deciding
whether to appeal the LPSC's order to lower the rates. Clearly, if they voted to appeal the rate decrease, they
would be raising the price of electricity charged to the customers for whom they worked. However, if the prices
were lowered, Cajun would be unable to service its debt. As a result, several members of the board resigned.
The remaining members voted to appeal the rate decrease. Cajun, 69 E3d at 747.
23. Cajun, 191 B.R. at 662.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Barry L. Zaretsky, Symposium, Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REv. 907, 917 (1993).
27. Id.
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Since Chapter X governed reorganizations of larger businesses with more com-
plicated debt and equity compositions, concerns for the investing public were
paramount.28 In an effort to protect these investors and exercise control over the
debtor, Chapter X required appointment of a trustee.29 Under this legislation, the
trustee had authority to operate the debtor's business, supply creditors and stock-
holders with information, and examine the debtor's activities." In addition, the
trustee was responsible for consulting with stockholders and creditors to create a
reorganization plan.3 ' The trustee, therefore, provided structure to the case by
serving as "the focal point about which formulation of the plan revolve[d]. '
Business reorganizations under Chapter XI generally involved more simplistic
debt and equity structures.33 The concern for regulating the debtor's affairs
became secondary since public investors were less likely to be significantly
affected. As such, appointment of a disinterested trustee was not available under
Chapter XI3 5 The debtor usually remained in possession of the estate, managing
the operation and developing and implementing a reorganization plan. 6
Although Chapter XI included a provision for appointment of a receiver, the
debtor normally remained in possession absent a specific reason to divest him of
control of the business.
31
While Chapter X permitted current management to remain after appointment
of a trustee, in most instances management was unseated by the appointment.'
Recognizing that management would be displaced in Chapter X, debtors were
influenced to attempt reorganization under Chapter XI where they could main-
tain possession and control of the estate. 9 However, numerous debtors, not eli-
gible to file under Chapter XI, theorized that if appointment of a trustee was
mandatory, they would not undertake reorganization proceedings until forced to
do so. ' Often, these efforts occurred too late to save the business.' As a result,
the mandatory trustee provision became a cumbersome and rather deterring
aspect of Chapter X reorganization. 2
B. Legislative History of§ 1104(a)(1)
Undoubtedly, no decision in a Chapter 11 proceeding will be more crucial to
the results achieved than the court's determination to either allow the debtor to
28. Id.
29. Id.
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remain in possession or to order appointment of a trustee. 3 Because of the crit-
ical nature of the decision, the standards for appointment of a trustee naturally
produced highly divergent views in Congress."
Section 1104(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code finds its origin in proposals and
recommendations submitted by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges."5 The
Commission, being dissatisfied with the capricious nature in which many deci-
sions to appoint Chapter 11 trustees were dealt, recommended that appointment
of a trustee be discretionary except in cases where the debtor was a corporation
with a debt burden of $1 million or more and three hundred or more security
holders." For business entities fitting this description, the Commission suggest-
ed that appointment of a trustee be presumptive, unless the bankruptcy court
found the protection provided by a trustee unwarranted or the expense involved
in the appointment disproportionate to the protection afforded."'
Following the Commission's proposal, the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges outlined an alternative Bankruptcy Act.' The Judges' plan differed in
many areas from the Commission's proposal; however, with respect to the
appointment of a trustee, the recommendations were analogous. 9 Both offered
the court considerable discretion in determining whether to appoint a trustee, as
well as a presumption in favor of appointment in larger cases.'0 Consequently,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter "SEC") stepped forward in
opposition to both proposals, asserting that elimination of the mandatory
appointment of trustees for public companies would leave investors' interests
unprotected. 1 The SEC claimed that the proposed legislation created excessive
delays, heightened the disruption associated with filing a bankruptcy petition,
and essentially failed to acknowledge the privileges of a disinterested trustee. 2
The SEC recommended deleting those portions of the Commission's and Judges'
proposals concerning discretionary appointment of a trustee and inserting a pro-
vision requiring "mandatory, immediate appointment of a trustee."
Ultimately, Congress rejected the SEC's proposal, but the recommendations
contained therein had an explicit impact on the legislative history of § 1104(a)."
In the following years., Senate bill S.2266 and House bill H.R.8200 materialized.
43. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1104.0114] (Lawrence P. King, 14th ed. 1994).
44. Id.
45. Robert J. Berdan and Bruce G. Arnold, Displacing the Debtor in Possession: The Requisites for and
Advantages of the Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 457, 463 (1984).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 464.





53. Id. The SEC's provision was modeled after § 156 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.
54. Id.
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1. Senate Bill S.2266
At the Ninety-fourth Congress, Senator DeConcini introduced S.2266.11 The
bill resembled the SEC's recommendation, modifying the proposals of the
Commission and Judges by mandating appointment of a trustee in any case
involving a "public company." 6 Public company was defined to include any
debtor who, within twelve months prior to filing the petition, had outstanding lia-
bilities of $5 million or more, exclusive of liabilities for goods, services, or taxes,
and no fewer than one thousand security holders. 7 In addition, the bill stated
that the court "may" order the election of or appoint a trustee "for cause" and
"shall" order appointment of a trustee if it would serve the interests of the estate
and security holders."
2. House Bill H.R.8200
The House bill provided that
upon the request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, a trustee
could be appointed, but only upon a showing that "1) the protection afforded by
a trustee is needed; and 2) the costs and expenses of a trustee would not be dis-
proportionately higher than the value of the protection afforded." 9
Since the proposed bill did not mandate appointment of a trustee,' there was con-
cern, as indicated in the accompanying House Report, that frequent appointment of
trustees might delay debtors' bankruptcy filings until they were beyond the point of
successful reorganization.6 ' To alleviate this concern, the Report suggested courts
undertake a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the protection afforded by a
trustee would be greater than the cost of such appointment.62
Ultimately, the House and Senate compromised on the issue of independent third
parties in bankruptcy proceedings.' Consequently, the Senate's proposal for a
mandatory trustee in public company cases was abandoned. Congress, instead, set-
tled on a provision allowing a party in interest to request appointment of an inde-
pendent examiner. 4 Thus, even in instances of the Senate's described "public com-
pany" cases, as long as a party in interest petitioned the court, an examiner, rather
than a trustee, would be appointed. This resolution represents a concession to the
Senate's insistence of an independent third party in public company cases.
55. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1104.03[2] (Lawrence P King, 15th ed., 1998).
56. Id.
57. Id.





63. Id. at 9 25.
64. Id.
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The compromised legislation suggests that a firm rule requiring either appoint-
ment of an independent third party or refusal of such appointment in every reor-
ganization case would neither foster efficient reorganization nor protect creditors
from fraud, mismanagement, or self-dealing." Congress' efforts evidence an
attempt to balance the need for a disinterested party to protect creditors' and
investors' interests with the desire to promote reorganization by encouraging
debtors to initiate proceedings while there is still opportunity for recovery."
C. Appointment of a Trustee "For Cause"
Pursuant to § 1104(a)(1), a party in interest may seek appointment of a trustee
for cause, including "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement"
of the debtor's business affairs before or after filing the petition. 7 The enumerat-
ed factors, however, are not exhaustive." According to the rules of construction
of the Bankruptcy Code, the words "includes" and "including" are not limiting. 9
Furthermore, courts have dismissed attempts to limit the "for cause" analysis to
cause "in the nature of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanage-
ment."70
Debtors' actions satisfying the "for cause" standard are not easily classifiable.71
However, there are a number of instances in which courts have appointed trustees
upon a showing of fraud,72 dishonesty,73 irreconcilable conflicts of interest,74
commingling of assets,7" and failure to pay taxes.76 In other cases, courts have
appointed a trustee where the debtor in possession has failed to make payments
to a secured party77 or has made unauthorized payments on account of pre-peti-
tion indebtedness.
78
65. Id. at 926.
66. Id.
67. Berdan & Arnold, supra note 45, at 475.
68. Id. at 476.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1994).
70. See, e.g., In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 17 B.R. 946, 950 (Bankr. 1st. Cir. 1982).
71. Berdan & Arnold, supra note 45, at 478.
72. See, e.g., In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781, 784 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (fraudulent conduct
designed to impede secured party's effort to enforce judgment by shifting assets between corporate debtors).
73. See, e.g., In re Deena Packaging Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 705, 707-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1983) (debtor failed
to disclose relevant financial data).
74. See, e.g., In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 B.R. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D. W Va. 1980) (inter-company transactions
created conflicts of interest and undermined presumption that management could make impartial decisions in
evaluating claims).
75. See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 B.R. 583, 585 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1983) (commingling of corporate and individual
matters by using corporate funds to finance personal litigation); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R.
328, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (funneling of monies from corporation for personal use by owner).
76. See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 B.R. 583, 585 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1983) (debtor failed to withhold taxes from
employee wages); In re La Sherene, Inc., 3 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (failure to remit $20,000 in
employment tax withholdings to the Internal Revenue Service).
77. See, e.g., In re McCall, 34 B.R. 68, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (failure to make monthly payments to
mortgagee for more than a two year period constituted gross mismanagement or incompetence).
78. See, e.g., In re Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 3 B.R. 591, 592 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (debtor used
funds to pay pre-petition debts after commencement of the case).
1998]
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Notably, courts have recognized the importance of management's ability to
earn the confidence of both secured and unsecured parties and are not disin-
clined to appoint a trustee in instances in which the debtor lacked credibility79 or
displayed an inability to effectuate a plan of reorganization." Courts have also
appointed a trustee to investigate and report whether a case should be convert-
ed,81 and in cases where the debtor was thrown out of possession82 or where an
individual Chapter 11 debtor died.83
The courts are, however, in unison on one issue. The time frame for a court's
review of a debtor's actions encompasses conduct both before and after com-
mencement of the case.8" Courts have stressed that "neither pre-petition repen-
tance nor a post-petition change of heart . . . will obviate the need for the
appointment of a trustee," and promises of future improvements in management
are supposition and irrelevant in determining whether past behavior necessitates
appointment of a trustee under § 1 104(a)(1). s
D. Judicial Construction and Analysis of§ 1104(a)(1)
The structure and legislative history of § 1104(a) exhibits a distinct Congres-
sional intent to allow a debtor to remain in possession of the estate.88 Courts, in
recognizing this presumption, have displayed reluctance in appointing a trustee.87
The judicial trend in analyzing this Code section reflects an appreciation for the
"fresh start" policy underlying much of the Bankruptcy Code and an investiga-
tive methodology suggested by the section's legislative history."
Additionally, courts have drawn a sharp distinction between the analysis
required for appointing a trustee pursuant to § 1104(a)(1) as opposed to §
1104(a)(2).' For cases involving § 1 104(a)(1), which require appointment "for
cause," the courts' discretion is necessarily more deliberate." Moreover, courts
have displayed discerning analysis of the statute and require the movant to estab-
lish "cause" under a "clear and convincing" standard. 1 Section 1 104(a)(2), on
the other hand, emphasizes the court's equity power to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis to ascertain whether appointing a trustee would serve the interests of the
creditors and security holders.
9 2
79. See, e.g., In re La Sherene, Inc., 3 B.R. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (debtor was inexperienced in
operational and managerial facets which consequently hindered relations with suppliers).
80. See, e.g., In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 B.R. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D. W Va. 1980) (debtor was unable to effec-
tuate a plan for reorganization).
81. See, e.g., In re Steak Loft of Oakdale, Inc., 10 B.R. 182, 186 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) and In re Hotel
Assocs., Inc., 7 B.R. 130, 132 (Bankr. ED. Pa. 1980) (citing instances where a trustee was appointed to exam-
ine debtor's financial history and report to the court whether the case should be converted to Chapter 7).
82. See, e.g., In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 17 B.R. 946, 951-52 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982).
83. See, e.g., In re Martin, 26 B.R. 39, 40 (Bankr. S.D. W Va. 1982) (supporting the argument that death of
individual debtor in a non-joint Chapter 11 proceeding establishes cause to appoint a trustee).
84. Berdan & Arnold, supra note 45, at 477.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 469.
87. Id. at 470.
88. Id. at 471.
89. Id. at 472.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 473.
92. Id.
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The judiciary's analysis of § 1104(a)(1) developed incrementally. Initially,
courts seemed restricted by the language of the Code. A subsequent shift in the
interpretation of the statute, however, opened the door to varying constructions
and utilization of the court's broad discretion.
1. Initial Interpretations
a. In re General Oil Distributors, Inc.
Illustrative of the initial analysis of § 1104(a)(1) is the opinion in In re General
Oil Distributors, Inc. 3 In 1984, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied a motion by creditors to appoint a trustee
where the debtor, though exhibiting no post-petition wrongdoing, had displayed
pre-petition incompetence, violations of fiduciary obligations, and dishonesty on
the part of managers."
In reviewing the motion, the court analyzed both the language of § 1104(a)(1)
and authoritative judicial opinions.9 According to the court, the words "shall
appoint a trustee" in § 1104(a) delineated its discretion.9 6 While the concepts of
gross mismanagement, dishonesty, and incompetence encompass a wide spec-
trum of conduct, the court held these actions must rise to a level sufficient to jus-
tify appointment of a trustee under § 1104(a)(1). 97 The court further determined
that although § 1104(a)(1) does not compel balancing the costs and benefits of
appointing a trustee, the judiciary cannot ignore any competing benefit or harm
an appointment may place upon the estate. 8 In applying this concept, the court
held that "appointment of a trustee in this case would impose a substantial finan-
cial burden on an estate already burdened by large administration expenses."99
Notably, the court emphasized the theme of Chapter 11 in that a debtor should
receive a fresh start, and stated that "current management should be permitted to
identify and correct past mistakes."100
b. Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co.
In 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rendered a
decisive opinion in Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co.1"1
The appellate court held cause did not exist to appoint a trustee where the debtor
was found in civil contempt for violating an order barring selective payment of
pre-petition debts without court approval. ' 2 The court concluded that no
93. 42 B.R. 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 408.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 409 (citing In re Main Line Motors, Inc., 9 B.R. 782, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980), affd, No. 80-
4444 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
99. Id. at 410.
100. Id. at 409.
101. 828 E2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987).
102. Id.
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instances of fraud, incompetence, or mismanagement were present and therefore
cause did not exist within the meaning of § 1104(a)(1).'013 Moreover, the court
stated that the illustrative language of § 1104(a)(1) comprises a wide variety of
conduct and courts have broad discretion in interpreting these concepts to estab-
lish cause." 4 In reviewing the debtor's situation, including the consequences of
appointing a trustee, the court reasoned that "to require appointment of a trustee,
regardless of the consequences, in the event of an act of dishonesty by the debtor,
however slight or immaterial, could frustrate the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act."' 5 Furthermore, § 1104(a)(1) must be interpreted to achieve harmony with
the Act in its entirety. 106
2. An Interpretive Shift
a. In re Sharon Steel Corp.
In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in an
oft-cited opinion, that a trustee may be appointed if a debtor in possession is mis-
managing the affairs of the estate."0 7 Sharon Steel, a steel manufacturer in
Pennsylvania, was faced with $742 million in liabilities, $478 million in assets,
and anxious creditors when the corporation filed a voluntary Chapter 11
petition."8 During the subsequent months, it became evident that Sharon's man-
agement (who was acting as debtor in possession) had maintained poor records,
made several questionable financial transactions, and a number of improper pre-
petition transfers. 9 The creditors' committee petitioned the bankruptcy court for
appointment of a trustee."0 The court, agreeing with the creditors, entered an
order removing the debtor from control of the estate and appointed a trustee to
administer the reorganization."'
In upholding the appointment, the Third Circuit stated that "section 1104(a)
decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis" and analogized Sharon to a
sinking ship running aground on the shoals of bankruptcy as a result of poor
management techniques." ' After reviewing the questionable transactions by
Sharon's management, the court determined their actions rose to the level of
"cause," necessitating appointment of a trustee under § 1 104(a)(1)." 3
103. Id. at 241.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 242.
106. ld. Other opinions denying appointment of a trustee used a similar analysis. See, e.g., In re Fisher &
Son, Inc., 70 B.R. 7 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (holding cause had not been established despite shareholder's
occupation of estate property without payment of rent); In re Stein and Day, Inc., 87 B.R. 290 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988) (declining appointment of a trustee where creditor failed to show fraud, incompetence, or gross misman-
agement of debtor's affairs); and In re John D. Gotta, 47 B.R. 198 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (creditor failed to
allege any of the statutorily listed grounds as cause for appointment of a trustee).
107. In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989).
108. Id. at 1218.
109. Id. at 1220.
110. Id. at 1218.
111. Id. at 1219.
112. Id. at 1226.
113. Id. at 1228.
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3. Subsequent Construction of § 1 104(a)(1)
a. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.
A particularly well publicized opinion displacing a debtor in possession was
the Eastern Air Lines decision involving the removal of Frank Lorenzo as chair-
man of the airline's board of directors.114 On March 9, 1989, Eastern Air Lines
filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code."
Roughly one year later, a committee of unsecured creditors moved for appoint-
ment of a Chapter 11 trustee to replace the debtor in possession and attempt reor-
ganization.
116
The creditors' committee argued that Eastern's financial losses, inability to
project the outcome of operations, and repeated default on reorganization agree-
ments constituted grounds for trustee appointment."7 In its analysis, the bank-
ruptcy court cited the legislative history of § 1 104(a)(1) indicating Congress'
expectation of a certain degree of mismanagement in all insolvency cases. '18 The
court concluded that a certain degree of pre-petition mismanagement may not be
sufficient grounds to appoint a trustee, but continuing mismanagement after the
filing date evidences the need for a disinterested third party. 9 Additionally, the
court discussed Congress' rationale for adopting a flexible standard for appoint-
ing trustees. 2 ' According to the court, this standard functions to achieve the twin
goals of 1) protection of the public interest and the interests of creditors and 2)
facilitation of a reorganization that will benefit both creditors and debtors.12'
The bankruptcy court concluded several of Eastern's actions constituted
incompetence within the meaning of § 1104(a)(1).122 Particularly, these were the
instances set forth in the committee's motion, as well as Eastern's general failure
to meet the terms of any of the plans of reorganization. 23 Furthermore, the court
recognized Eastern's duty, as a debtor in possession, to act as a fiduciary to its
creditors "to protect and conserve property" for the benefit of creditors and "to
refrain from acting in a manner which could damage the estate or hinder a suc-
cessful reorganization of the business." '24 Accordingly, the court stated that if a
debtor cannot fulfill these fiduciary obligations, appointment of a Chapter 11
trustee may be the only way to effectively accomplish the twin goals of the
Code. '2
114. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 123 B.R. 166 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991), aff d, 22 F3d 403 (2nd Cir. 1944).
115. Id. at 166.
116. Id.
117. Id.




122. Id. at 170.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 169.
125. Id.
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b. Wabash Valley Power Association v. Rural Electrification Administration
Though not a case directly concerning appointment of a trustee, in Wabash
Valley Power Association v. Rural Electrification Administration126 (hereinafter
"REA"), the Seventh Circuit suggested in dicta that where a debtor's interests are
being served at the expense of its creditors, removal of the debtor from posses-
sion may be necessary to protect creditor interests.127
Wabash, a non-profit rural electric cooperative, was operating as a debtor in
possession when it filed an action seeking declaratory judgment that REA could
not unilaterally increase Wabash's wholesale electricity rates.128 In a poignant
aside, the court noted that a debtor in bankruptcy is expected to maximize the
value of the estate. 2 In this instance, according to the court, Wabash's opposi-
tion to a rate increase served the interests of Wabash's members at the expense of
the interests of its creditors. 3 Circuit Judge Easterbrook noted, "[W]e are sur-
prised that the bankruptcy judge has allowed Wabash to operate as debtor in pos-
session, when the clash of interests between creditors and its current manage-
ment is so obvious.
131
c. In re Colorado- Ute Electric Association
In late 1990, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado
heard motions for appointment of a trustee in a case involving a bankrupt electric
utility.1 32 Colorado-Ute Electric Association, a privately owned non-profit elec-
tric association, was engaged in the business of generating and transmitting elec-
tric energy for wholesale distribution to its fourteen rural electric cooperative
members. 33 The utility was managed by a board of directors consisting of indi-
viduals nominated by the board of each member cooperative and elected by
Colorado-Ute's membership at the annual board meeting.3 In June 1989, after
several failed efforts to raise electric rates to increase revenue, a number of the
utility's largest creditors filed an involuntary petition for relief under Chapter
1 1.13 Colorado-Ute did not contest the petition.
1 36
In support of their motion for appointment of a trustee, Colorado-Ute's credi-
tors cited gross mismanagement, incompetence, and a general lack of confidence
in the managerial aptitude of the current staff.137 In addition, the creditors assert-
126. 903 E2d 445 (7th Cir. 1990).
127. Id. at 451.




132. In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 120 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
133. Id. at 166.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 169.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 172.
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ed that the board of directors and members were divided due to an inherent con-
flict of interest resulting from the directors "wearing hats as both board members
and creditor representatives of the co-op members." '138
The court opined that § 1104(a) "represents a potentially important protection
that the Court should not lightly disregard or encumber with overly protective
attitudes towards debtors-in-possession." 39 Additionally, there need not be a spe-
cific finding of any of the enumerated wrongs stipulated in § 1104(a)(1) to find
cause to appoint a trustee. ' Consequently, the court held cause existed to
replace the debtor in possession with a trustee. 4 The principal rationale cited
by the court for finding cause was the conflict between and among Colorado-Ute
and the board of directors.'42 The co-op members were divided on the issue of
the rate increase and Colorado-Ute's former chairman and vice-chairman ulti-
mately resigned due to the conflicts between what their respective co-ops desired
and what was best for Colorado-Ute.1 ' In conclusion, the court stated it could
not "envision a way for the current management and board to resolve the inher-
ent conflict between what is best for Colorado-Ute, its creditors and the co-op
members.1
144
d. In re Bellevue Place Associates
In a 1994 decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held appointment of a trustee was necessary to fulfill fiducia-
ry obligations owed to creditors and equity security holders. 4  The movant, a
creditor, cited no instances of gross mismanagement, incompetence, or fraud,
only that the debtor's fiduciary obligations were hampered by a "Management
Agreement."4" The debtor asserted that the terms of the "agreement," which was
a contract involving himself and the manager of a hotel owned by him, usurped
his ability to discharge duties, in particular fiduciary duties, to creditors and
equity security holders as a debtor in possession.147
.The court analyzed the language of § 1104(a)(1), stating that the grounds for
appointment of a trustee are not limited to the "derelictions" specifically enu-
merated in the statute. "a The court reasoned that the fiduciary duties of a debtor
in possession prohibit debtors from acting in their self-interests to the exclusion
of other protected interests.14 9 In this instance, the court found that under the
terms of the agreement, the debtor was under the control and direction of one
138. Id.
139. Id. at 173.
140. Id. at 174.
141. Id. at 175.
142. Id. The court also found a pervasive lack of confidence among Colorado-Ute's creditors in the debtor's
ability to reorganize effectively.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 176.
145. In re Bellevue Place Assocs., 171 B.R. 615 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1994).
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secured creditor."' Consequently, the court held that an inability to fulfill fidu-
ciary obligations of a debtor in possession was sufficient to establish cause for
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.'5 '
IV PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE INSTANT CASE
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana presided
over Cajun Electric's bankruptcy proceedings." 2 In In re Cajun Electric Power
Cooperative, Inc., the district court, in reviewing the RUS's motion for appoint-
ment of a trustee, analyzed § 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to determine
whether appointment of a trustee was necessary to effectuate reorganization of
the electric cooperative.5 3 In addition, the court reviewed opinions from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado." '
According to § 1 104(a)(1), a court shall appoint a trustee "for cause, including
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement . . . or similar
cause."'55 The district court reasoned that grounds for appointing a trustee for
cause are not limited to those enumerated in § 1 104(a)(1) and can consist of
other factors, including actual conflicts of interest. 56 Additionally, upon review-
ing § 1 104(a)(2), the court determined that appointment of a trustee may be nec-
essary, even if cause does not exist, if it would be in the best interests of the cred-
itors.'s7
In addition to the above analysis, the district court examined opinions from the
Seventh Circuit and the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado5 8 In
Wabash Valley Power Association v. Rural Electrification Administration,' the
Seventh Circuit suggested in dicta that appointment of a trustee would be appropri-
ate where a debtor's interests are being served at the expense of its creditors."6
Due to the factual similarity between Wabash and Cajun, both electric coopera-
tives, the district court was particularly persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's sugges-
tion that conflicts of interest between management and creditors could provide
cause to appoint a trustee in order to maximize the value of the debtor's estate.' 6'
150. Id. at 624.
151. Id.
152. In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 191 B.R. 659 (M.D. La. 1995). District Judge Frank Polozola
presided over Cajun's bankruptcy proceedings as well as the contract litigation involving GSU previously men-
tioned in this Note. With regard to the other litigation, the reference was withdrawn.
153. Id. at661.
154. Id. at 663.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
156. Cajun, 191 B.R. at 661.
157. Id. The court noted that this section of the Code is particularly flexible because it allows for considera-
tion of the following factors: 1) the debtor's trustworthiness; 2) the debtor's past and present performance and
the potential for the debtor's rehabilitation; 3) the confidence level of the business community; and 4) the bene-
fits derived from appointment of a trustee versus the cost of the appointment. Id.
158. Id. at 663.
159. 903 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1990).
160. Id. at 451. This excerpt was a passing observation, however, and the court cited no authority for its nota-
tion.
161. Cajun, 191 B.R. at 663.
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Added support was found in the reasoning of In re Colorado-Ute Electric
Association.1 62 Colorado-Ute, also a rural electrification cooperative, was alleged
to have conflicts of interest similar to Cajun." 3 The Colorado-Ute court found
the conflicts between the board and its creditors "formidable" and appointment
of a trustee necessary to alleviate the tensions.""
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the inherent conflicts between Cajun,
its board members, and its creditors established cause to appoint a trustee in bank-
ruptcy 6 Disagreement over whether to appeal the order of the Louisiana Public
Service Commission, management's failure to collect monies owed by member
cooperatives, and Cajun's primary interest in protecting the lower rates it was
charging members substantiated the court's decision. The court stated that "[t]he
many conflicts of interest that Cajun's management, directors and members have
with each other and with their creditors and the estate mandates that there be a
trustee appointed to operate the estate in a fair and impartial manner." '6 Given the
broad statutory language offering significant discretion to appoint a trustee and the
available persuasive authority, the court concluded that appointment of a trustee
was essential to effectively reorganize the estate. In summation, the court stated
that "[i]f ever there was a need for a trustee in a Chapter 11 case, this is one." '167
V INSTANT CASE
A. Cajun I
Cajun Electric appealed the district court's order appointing a Chapter 11
trustee.l 8 In reviewing the lower court's decision under the abuse of discretion
standard, the Fifth Circuit first considered whether the appointment could be jus-
tified under § 1 104(a)(1).1 19 As previously noted, the district court relied on
Cajun's alleged conflicts of interest to meet the "for cause" standard. 70 The
appellate court, however, stated that "[t]he district court gave several reasons for
appointing a trustee, but they all stemmed from one conflict of interest: Cajun's
inherent conflict between the interests of its member-customers, who want low
162. 120 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 175.
165. Cajun, 191 B.R. at 663.
166. Id. at 662.
167. Id. at 664.
168. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., v. Central La. Elec. Co., 69 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995). Due to the overlap
of the appellate court's initial opinion with its final opinion, this Note will discuss both Fifth Circuit decisions
in the Instant Case section.
169. Id. at 749.
170. Id. The district court cited the following examples of conflicts:
(1) dispute over appealing the Louisiana Public Service Commission order setting rates; (2) failure
to collect monies owed by its member-customers; (3) failure to allow members access to information
and to participate in possible sales of Cajun's assets; (4) failure to take a position in litigation
between the LPSC and the RUS over which entity had the power to regulate its rates; (5) the inter-
ests of some of Cajun's members in purchasing some of its assets; and (6) the existence and nature
of the all-requirements contracts between Cajun and its member-customers.
Id. at n.13.
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rates, and those of its creditors, who want to raise rates.""' 1 Moreover, the court
rejected the trustee's appointment on the basis that the inherent conflicts
stemmed from Cajun's cooperative organizational structure, a structure that
Congress advocated for utility companies receiving loans from the RUS.72 The
appellate court reasoned that "[t]he fact that Congress and the RUS encouraged--
if not required--Cajun to organize itself as a cooperative leads us to believe that
any conflict inherently arising from Cajun's organization as a cooperative is
insufficient to justify the appointment of a trustee."' 3 The court further noted
that "holding that these inherent conflicts constitute cause for appointing a
trustee would create a per se rule permitting the appointment of a trustee in any
case involving a cooperative," with no indication Congress intended such specif-
ic treatment."'
Appellee, Central Louisiana Electric Company, relied on In re Colorado-Ute
Electric Association for the argument that conflicts inherent in any cooperative
justify appointment of a trustee."5 The appellate court, however, found the deci-
sion distinguishable. In Colorado-Ute, the district court found the debtor had
committed a number of "bad acts.""76 Bad acts generally refer to debtor conduct
that damages the estate or undermines the reorganization effort. 7 Specifically,
the electric cooperative's management allegedly made a $20 million transfer on
the eve of bankruptcy in an attempt to destroy a creditor's security interest. 8 In
addition, the district court determined Colorado-Ute's board and management
were not competent to reorganize an enterprise of that scale. 9
In comparison, the Fifth Circuit found no such "bad acts" or incompetence
concerns with Cajun's directors and managers."' 0 The court concluded that the
factors supporting appointment of a trustee under the Colorado-Ute rationale
were not present in Cajun and as such, there was no cause for appointment of a
trustee.'
In addition, the appellate court reviewed the district court's reliance on
§ 1104(a)(2), the best interests standard, for appointment of a trustee.8 2 The
court held that since Cajun's conflicts were not sufficient to justify appointing a
trustee pursuant to § 1104(a)(1), they did not compel the appointment as in the
best interests of the parties. 3 Furthermore, reasoning that the parties to the case
would be the best judges of their own interests, the court stated that the debtor's
171. Id. (footnote omitted).
172. Id. at 750. As previously noted, the RUS was one of Cajun's largest creditors. See supra, notes 21-23
and accompanying text.
173. Cajun, 69 F.3d at 750.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 120 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
177. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
178. Colorado-Ute, 120 B.R. at 170.
179. Id. at 176.
180. Cajun, 69 E3d at 750.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 751.
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appeal, along with several creditors' appeals to the appointment of a trustee, evi-
denced that the parties' best interests were not being served.184 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's appointment of
a trustee to administer the reorganization of Cajun Electric.18
Circuit Judge Emilio M. Garza submitted an opinion in which he concurred in
part and dissented in part with the majority decision. 86 In particular, Judge
Garza disagreed that in affirming the appointment of a trustee, a per se rule
would be created under which any cooperative seeking Chapter 1 1 protection
would be automatically subject to appointment of a trustee. 87 According to
Garza, the conflicts present in Cajun were sufficient to support appointment of a
trustee under § 1 104(a)(1) in that they went beyond "inherent" conflicts under
which all healthy cooperatives function. 88 In support of this proposition, he
asserted that "healthy cooperatives do not fail to collect monies owed by mem-
ber-customers or attempt to deny member-customers access to information." '89
Furthermore, he opined that the majority failed to make a distinction between
conflicts "inherent" in any cooperative and those that "arise from" inherent con-
flicts.19 Although the former would be protected by Congress' policy choice, the
latter would not. He noted that under the majority view, a cooperative would be
shielded from appointment of a trustee no matter how serious the internal con-
flicts were, if those conflicts could be traced to the cooperative structure. 9 '
Judge Garza exhibited added concern as to whether healthy cooperatives,
which are contemplating reorganization, consider strategies that appear to be
designed to break-up and scavenge the assets of the debtor.8 He noted that
some of Cajun's member-customers had expressed an interest in purchasing the
debtor's assets, either individually or by creating a joint venture with one or more
other members. 93 Citing Colorado-Ute, Garza stated that "once cooperative
members begin working at cross-purposes, to the extent Cajun's members have,
the appointment of a trustee may be the only effective way to pursue reorganiza-
tion."94
B. Cajun II
Appellee, Central Louisiana Electric Company, filed petitions for rehearing
and suggestions for rehearing en banc before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 9 The appellate court granted rehearing.
184. Id.
185. Id.




190. Id. at n.1.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 751. Garza suggested that Cajun's failure to collect monies owed by member-customers and the




195. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., v. Central La. Elec. Co., 74 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996).
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The opinion, in its entirety, reads as follows:
After re-reading the stipulation on file in this case, we find the conflicts of
interest within the members of the Board of Cajun Electric Power Cooperative,
Inc., to be such that the court below was correct in the appointment of a trustee.
We therefore withdraw all of the prior opinion found at 69 F.3d 746 [the majori-
ty opinion vacating appointment of a trustee] and we adopt the reasoning of the
dissent in its place. The appointment of the trustee is therefore AFFIRMED.19
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Common Theme Underlying "Similar Cause"
The express terms of § 1104(a) indicate that a court "shall" appoint a trustee if
there is a finding of "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement." 97
The legislative history and structure of § 1 104(a), however, evidence Congress'
intent to allow discretionary appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. 98 The illustrative
nature of § 1104(a)(1) offers courts the opportunity to appoint a disinterested third
party, at its discretion, in a variety of instances determined primarily through case-
by-case analysis. 99 The enumerated factors in the statute indicate an overriding
theme in the Code to displace the debtor where the viability of the business is threat-
ened. 0 or when the debtor is failing to preserve the organization's assets for the ben-
efit of its creditors." 1 Moreover, by incorporating the encompassing term "similar
cause" into the statutory scheme, Congress offered courts the opportunity to dis-
place debtors whose actions do not comport with the enumerated factors under the
statute but remain consistent with the theme of removing debtors who detrimentally
affect the reorganization effort or are dissipating the estate's assets. Recognizing
this ideology in the Code is fundamental to understanding that an attempt to define
"similar cause" in terms more specific than a "theme" would undermine the discre-
tionary authority of the court. In Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants, for
instance, the Fourth Circuit stated that "concepts of incompetence and dishonesty
encompass a wide spectrum of conduct and courts have broad discretion in applying
such concepts to show cause."2"2 In addition to concepts of incompetence and dis-
honesty, courts necessarily have broad discretion to interpret "similar cause" in
order to adequately protect the interests of both debtors and creditors.
196. Id. at 600. Cajun filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme Court on
April 22, 1996.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). Although use of the word "shall" circumscribes the court's discretion, the
legislative history and judicial holdings illustrate the courts' authority to determine whether conduct shown
rises to a level sufficient to justify appointment of a trustee. Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H.
Robins Co., 828 E2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987).
198. See supra notes 67-92 and accompanying text. A court's decision not to appoint a trustee is clearly with-
in its discretionary authority unless the court finds "cause," in which case the court must appoint a trustee. In
re Oklahoma Refining Co., 838 E2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1988).
199. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 E2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989).
200. See In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R. 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989).
201. See In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643 (Bankr. WD. Mich. 1992).
202. Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants, 828 F.2d at 241.
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Case law indicates an evolution in the use of this discretionary authority since
the enactment of the Code. These opinions suggest an ongoing attempt by courts
to balance the statutory emphasis on preserving the assets of the business for the
benefit of creditors with protecting debtors' rights to reorganize." 3 Early efforts
resolved this tension in favor of retaining the debtor in possession. Recent cases,
however, reflect a trend of judicial skepticism regarding debtors and a greater
willingness to appoint a trustee. In 1984, the court in In re General Oil Distri-
butors, Inc. declined to appoint a trustee, despite numerous findings of pre-peti-
tion wrongdoing, stating the philosophy of Chapter 11 offers debtors a "second
chance" and management should, therefore, be permitted to correct past mis-
takes.2"4 Similarly, in Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants, a 1987 decision,
the Fourth Circuit, in declining appointment of a trustee, appeared constrained by
the terms of § 1104(a)(1), noting that a trustee is needed where fraud or misman-
agement arise and appointment of a trustee for slight instances of dishonesty
could frustrate the philosophy of the Bankruptcy Act.20 '
By 1989, however, the balance began to shift toward a more liberal use of the
court's discretion to appoint a trustee. In In re Sharon Steel, the Third Circuit
found cause to appoint a trustee, basing its decision on the language of the Code
and interpreting therein a requirement of evident wrongdoing on the part of the
debtor.20 ' Although Sharon's management was involved in postpetition wrongdo-
ing, its actions were no more egregious than that of debtors in earlier cases. The
court's holding in Sharon Steel initiated the "bad acts" model, launching a line of
cases theorizing that if management's conduct threatened the assets of the estate
or jeopardized the business' potential for reorganization, cause was established
pursuant to § 1104(a)(1).207 In so doing, Sharon Steel marks a shift in the inter-
pretation of § 1104(a)(1). Under Sharon Steel, appointment of a trustee is not
only appropriate where management is explicitly impairing creditors' interests
(the traditional definition of cause), but also where aspects of the debtor's situa-
tion present an impediment to reorganization.0 ' Consequently, this construction
opened the door for courts to interpret the statute broadly to permit appointment
of a trustee in a variety of circumstances.
Subsequent cases, Wabash Valley Power Association v. Rural Electrification
Administration,"9 In re Colorado-Ute Electric Association,21 and In re Cajun
Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.,2" built on the Sharon Steel model, extending the
203. See, e.g., Berdan & Arnold, supra note 45, at 471.
204. 42 B.R. 402, 409 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984). Despite the express language of § 104(a)(l) requiring con-
sideration of a debtor's conduct before and after filing the petition, the court found the presumption that a
debtor should remain in possession outweighed the need for a trustee. Id.
205. Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants, 828 E2d at 242. See generally Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,
411 (1992), for use of pre-Code practices as guidance in interpreting provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.
206. 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 903 F2d 445 (7th Cir. 1990).
210. 120 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
211. 69 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995).
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reasoning to situations where conflicts of interest frustrate the reorganization
effort. '2 Wabash suggested that inherent conflicts could establish cause if the
debtor was not acting to maximize the value of the estate." 3 Colorado-Ute and
Cajun put that suggestion into motion. While the court in Colorado-Ute did not
solely base its decision to appoint a trustee on the inherent conflicts issue, that was
the principal rationale.214 In Cajun, the Fifth Circuit completely relied on conflicts
of interest inherent in Cajun's board and management to establish cause under
§ 1104(a)(1)215 In both cases, the courts implied that the source of the conflicts
was less important than the effect of the conflicts on the reorganization effort.
Although these later cases contradict earlier opinions, they are consistent with
the theme underlying § 1104(a)(1). Earlier cases, in attempting to balance the
Chapter 11 reorganization principle with the need to protect creditors and investors,
pointedly sided with the fresh start philosophy and used its discretion narrowly. In
the early to mid-1980s, courts aggressively protected the debtor in possession's
prerogatives, displaying a principal concern with the presumption that a debtor
continue in operation of the estate and a reluctance to displace management.
Beginning with Sharon Steel, however, the early enthusiasm for the debtor in pos-
session concept abated and subsequent decisions reflect a more dominant concern
for protecting creditors, equity investors, and industries affected by bankrupt orga-
nizations from the risk of further loss. Construing § 1104(a)(1) broadly, as recent
cases have done, comports with the legislative history of the statute and the statu-
tory language and structure of the provision, both seeking to balance each party's
interests and promote reorganization. With an estimated 171% increase in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings between 1980 and 1989, courts were faced with
staggering numbers of creditors requesting protection of their. interests."' Added
concern of abuse of Chapter 11 protection by debtors using the reorganization
provision as a mechanism for solving business difficulties" 7 undoubtedly
prompted courts to reassess the language of the statute and offer innovative inter-
pretations capable of protecting creditors' interests as efficiently as the interests
of the debtor in possession.
B. Shortcomings of the Fifth Circuit Decision
In Cajun, the Fifth Circuit premised its decision on the illustrative language
and underlying theme of § 1104(a)(1)." 8 The opinion, however, (reproduced in
its entirety above) offers little guidance to one looking for extensive discourse on
212. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., although not a conflict of interest case, illustrates the court's awareness of a
debtor impeding reorganization even if not engaged in bad acts. 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Additionally, in In re Bellevue Place Associates, the court ventured into the area of fiduciary obligations, recog-
nizing that failure to meet such duties can justify appointment of a trustee, thus continuing with the theme of
the Code. 171 B.R. 615 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1994).
213. Wabash, 903 E2d at 448.
214. Colorado-Ute, 120 B.R. at 176.
215. Cajun, 69 E3d at 750.
216. BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 32 (Christopher M. McHugh, ed., 1996).
217. Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 831 (1996).
218. Cajun, 69 E3d at 750.
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the rationale for appointment of a trustee where a debtor's conflicts of interest
establish cause Under § 1 104(a)(1). As noted above, the Fifth Circuit's decision
represents a logical progression in the court's efforts to protect creditors' inter-
ests. However, when given the opportunity to lay a solid foundation for future
jurists to use in analyzing grounds for appointment of a trustee where conflicts of
interest exist within a debtor, the court declined. Judge Emilio Garza's opinion
appears to accept the premise that purely "inherent conflicts," standing alone,
cannot constitute cause where Congress has encouraged that particular business
structure. Given the importance of distinguishing "inherent" conflicts from
"arising from" conflicts, it is dissatisfying that the court failed to provide any
means for distinguishing inherent conflicts of interest from conflicts "arising
from" inherent conflicts, or how severe the conflicts must be before they consti-
tute "similar cause." 219
In addition, the court neglected to consider whether appointment of an examin-
er could resolve the issue of Cajun's conflicts of interest. 22  Unlike a trustee, an
examiner does not displace current management.221 Instead, an examiner's statu-
tory role is to investigate aspects of the underlying business operation, including
allegations of fraud, misconduct, or irregularity in the management of the affairs
of the debtor, and report any findings to the court.222 Examiners are appointed
under a similar rationale as trustees 23 and are often used by courts as a less intru-
sive mechanism for handling the affairs of an insolvent debtor.
C. Effect on Cooperative Businesses
There are approximately forty-seven thousand business cooperatives operating
in the United States today.224 These organizations benefit over one million con-
sumers and employ a diverse group of individuals. 22  Cooperatives, in general,
are founded upon similar organizational structures. In most instances, a coopera-
tive is comprised of a group of people operating their own businesses who col-
lectively form an organization to provide themselves with a particular service. 26
Co-op membership includes business firms as well as individuals. 227 These
members own and operate the co-op and are the principal users of the organiza-
tion's services. 228 Business cooperatives include such diverse entities as agricul-
219. In fact, to the extent that any of the conflicts identified were actually "inherent" conflicts, it follows that
the circuit court should have remanded the case for reconsideration with those factors excluded.
220. Under § 1104(c), the court may appoint an examiner upon request by a party in interest if the court does
not order the appointment of a trustee. II U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994). The legislative history suggests that
appointment of an examiner may often be more appropriate than appointing a trustee. See H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
221. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994).
222. Id.
223. Id. In appointing an examiner, courts undertake a cost-benefit analysis (also used under § 1104(a)(2))
whereby the protection must be needed and the cost must not be disproportionate. Id.
224. Telephone Interview with Richard Hyne, National Cooperative Business Association (Mar. 10, 1997).
225. Id.
226. James B. Dean and Donald A. Frederick, Business Cooperatives: Characteristics, Opportunities and
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tural cooperatives, rural electric cooperatives, credit unions, insurance compa-
nies, and national corporations. 29
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Cajun provided insufficient rationale to estab-
lish a per se rule requiring appointment of a trustee for Chapter 11 coopera-
tives.23 As previously noted, the opinion failed to provide any mechanism for
distinguishing inherent conflicts from conflicts "arising from" inherent con-
flicts.231 Moreover, the court offered little guidance regarding how severe con-
flicts of interest must be before they constitute "similar cause." Because of the
shortcomings of the Fifth Circuit opinion, subsequent decisions will turn on the
facts of each case, requiring an inquiry into the level of inherent conflicts versus
conflicts "arising from" inherent conflicts. Thus, the singular aspect of being a
cooperative business will not automatically subject Chapter 11 cooperatives to
appointment of a trustee.
Appointing a trustee based on conflicts of interest does, however, establish a
significant pitfall for cooperatives seeking reorganization. Although the standard
set forth in Cajun protects creditors of cooperative businesses as well as non-
cooperative businesses, the policy establishes a deterrent for struggling co-ops in
need of the safe harbor of Chapter 11. As previously noted, a compelling ratio-
nale underlying the 1978 Code was that the near automatic appointment of a
trustee under the prior Bankruptcy Act deterred the timely filing of a petition,
resulting in further loss to financially unstable debtors.232 The standard promul-
gated in Cajun places cooperatives in a similar undesirable position.
The Supreme Court has declined to consider whether the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Cajun complies with the language and interpretive limits of
§ 1 104(a)(1).233 Congress, however, remains an alternative source for instituting
a special provision for some or all debtor cooperatives. Similar provisions have
been drafted for single-asset real estate businesses, 234 small businesses, 2 3 and
family farmers.23' Legislative efforts must exhibit an awareness of a debtor's
organizational structure and permit appointment of a trustee in instances of
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, gross mismanagement, and conflicts of interest
sufficient to hinder reorganization. If Congress waives the opportunity to draft a
provision for cooperative businesses, future opinions will undoubtedly reflect
courts' efforts to carve out a policy by judicial fiat.
229. Id. Some examples of national corporations include: The Associated Press, Florist and Telegraph
Delivery Service (FTD), Ocean Spray, and True Value Hardware. Id.
230. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Central La. Elec. Co., 74 F3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996).
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
233. Cajun's petition for writ of certiorari was denied on October 8, 1996.
234. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (1994).
235. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (1994).
236. 11 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Section 1104(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code offers creditors the opportunity to
pursue appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee "for cause." '237 The legislative history
and statutory structure of § 1 104(a)(1) evidence Congress' intent to provide
courts with discretionary authority to appoint a trustee where a debtor is impair-
ing creditors' interests or jeopardizing reorganization.238 Recent opinions reflect
a shift in the construction of the statute, suggesting a broad interpretation of the
provision and a dominant concern for protecting creditors' interests.
In Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Central Louisiana Electric Co.,
the Fifth Circuit extended the interpretation of § 1104(a)(1) to allow for appoint-
ment of a Chapter 11 trustee when a debtor's inherent conflicts of interest hinder
effective reorganization. 9 While this interpretation remains consistent with the
underlying theme of § 1104(a)(1), the decision arguably contradicts the underly-
ing purpose of the 1978 Code by establishing a profound deterrent for coopera-
tive businesses seeking reorganization. Under the prior Bankruptcy Act,
Congressional legislation corrected a similar problem with Chapter X.240 Again,
legislation could abrogate the deterrent facing cooperatives attempting reorgani-
zation. Absent legislative intervention, the judiciary remains the singular alter-
native for instituting an effective safe harbor policy for cooperative organiza-
tions.
237. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
238. See supra notes 62-92 and accompanying text.
239. 74 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996).
240. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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